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‘Jensen’s Scientific Approach’ to Religion Education
Tim Jensen1
• Following an initial programmatic summary of ‘fundamentals’, the au-
thor puts forward (with reference to other programmatic ‘minimum 
presuppositions’ for the scientific study of religion(s)) his basic presup-
positions and principles for a scientific study-of-religion(s)-based reli-
gion education as a time-tabled, compulsory, and totally normal school 
subject, taught by teachers educated at study-of-religion(s) departments 
of public universities. The article, thus, reflects what Cathy Byrne named 
‘Jensen’s scientific approach’ to religion education.
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Jensenov znanstveni pristop k religijskemu 
izobraževanju
Tim Jensen
• Sledeč izhodiščnemu programskemu povzetku ‘osnov’, avtor predstavi 
(s sklicevanjem na programske ‘minimalne predpostavke’ za znanstveno 
preučevanje religij(e)) svoje temeljne predpostavke in načela za na re-
ligiologiji temelječe religijsko izobraževanje, ki poteka v obliki v redni 
urnik umeščenega obveznega in povsem običajnega šolskega predmeta, 
poučujejo pa ga učitelji, izobraženi na religioloških oddelkih javnih 
univerz. Ta prispevek osvetljuje tisto, kar je Cathy Byrne poimenovala 
‘Jensenov znanstveni pristop’ k religijskemu izobraževanju.
 Ključne besede: religijsko izobraževanje, znanstveni pristop k 
religijskemu izobraževanju, religiologija 
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Programmatic ‘Fundamentals’
1) Religion is a human, cultural, social and historical phenomenon. 2) 
Granted that scientifically based knowledge of humankind, history (evolu-
tion too), nature, culture, social formation, identity formation, etc. is consid-
ered essential and valuable knowledge, then scientifically based knowledge of 
religion(s) must be considered equally essential and valuable. 3) Religion(s) 
can, like other historical, social, and cultural phenomena, be scientifically re-
searched, analysed, interpreted, and explained,  – and the scientific research 
results can be ‘translated’ into teaching, at both the university and public 
school levels. 4) The production of valuable scientifically based knowledge of 
religion(s), leading to more and more qualified knowledge of humankind, his-
tory, evolution, culture, etc., can and must engage a variety of scholars from 
the natural, social, and human sciences. However, specialist knowledge of 
religion(s) has for more than a century been pursued by scholars at specific 
university departments for the study of religion(s).These departments are still 
a sine qua non for a concerted and strategic scientific study of religion.2 5) If 
scientifically produced knowledge of humankind, nature, and culture, includ-
ing religion, is considered to be of scientific and cultural value and, therefore, 
to be funded by the state, then this state-funded research and knowledge must 
be shared with the public at large and not kept as a ‘professional secret’ among 
scholars within academia. 6) For a state to ensure that this valuable knowl-
edge is shared with society at large, it must ensure that public school educa-
tion reflects and transmits the knowledge produced at the public universities. 
7) Though knowledge of religion(s) can and must be sought and produced by 
a series of sciences and also taught and touched upon in school subjects such 
as history, literature, and in the natural and other social sciences subjects, a 
specific time-tabled compulsory and totally normal school subject – study-of-
religion(s)-based religion education (RE) – taught by teachers educated at the 
study-of-religions departments must be established. Only in this way can the 
state ensure that teaching about religion(s) in school is as scientifically based 
as is the teaching of other school subjects. 8) By providing a scientific study of 
2 In this article, the author refers indiscriminately to ‘science of religion’, ‘scientific study of 
religion(s),’ and ‘religious studies’ in order to refer to what has also been called ‘Religionswis-
senschaft’, ‘history of religions’, ‘comparative religion’, and the ‘study of religion’ (or ‘study of reli-
gions’). With reference to the International Association for the History of Religion (IAHR) and 
its notion of the academic study of religion(s) as ‘historical, social and comparative’, the author 
subscribes to a concept of a kind of ‘history’ or ‘study’ of religion(s) that includes a wide range of 
historical, comparative, critical-analytical, sociological, psychological etc. approaches to religion 
as a human phenomenon (and theoretical object) and to religions as more or less observable 
historical, social and cultural traditions.
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religion(s) at public universities and a study-of-religion(s)-based RE in pub-
lic schools, the state, moreover, provides for a second-order analytical-critical 
discourse on religion, a second-order discourse that may, arguably, be seen as 
crucial to the well-being and well-functioning of an open, secular (not ‘secular-
ist’), pluralist and democratic society. 9) Moreover, the RE thus offered can help 
provide citizens at large with ‘general education’ (‘Allgemeinbildung’), as well 
as with analytical and communicative competences needed for the skilled ex-
ecution of various professions in today’s society and world. Such competences 
are often also aimed at in so-called ‘citizenship education’. 10) The contents of 
the public school RE are to reflect, pedagogically and didactically tailored to 
the various age groups, the public university scientific study-of-religions pro-
grammes and contents. It is to be a ‘mini’ (or ‘school’) study-of-religion(s). 
‘Religion: A Human Phenomenon’ 
If scientifically based knowledge, in general, is considered valuable and 
a must, at least to such a degree that the state finds it worthwhile to produce 
such knowledge at state-financed public universities, then scientifically based 
knowledge about religion necessarily must also be considered valuable, and 
scientific studies of religion(s) thus also must be state-financed and located at 
public universities. This, then, is the first evident matter of fact as well as the 
primary, totally straightforward, logical and solid argument in favour of a sci-
entific study of religion(s).3
However, let me add a few more words: the so-called ‘modern research 
university’, dedicated to the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, has been and 
still is ‘under attack’. It has, nevertheless, as scholar of religion Donald Wiebe 
(2019) points out, been an exponent of what Ernest Gellner in Postmodernism, 
Reason, and Religion called a specific ‘Western epistemic tradition’, an expres-
sion of what constituted ‘a new cultural value’ (Gellner, 1992, p. 85).
What most scholars of religion still, despite all critical approaches to the 
term and concept ‘religion’ as well as to the ‘study of religion(s)’, analyse and 
discuss in terms of religion, is ‘something’ that has been and still is of impor-
tance in the past and present history of the world and mankind. What may be 
termed religious ways of thinking and acting have, according to the most recent 
3 Having theology departments at the public universities, it must be added, is not the same. Though 
much work done within theology is unmistakably scientific in both theory, method, and aim, 
other kinds  (e.g. within systematic or practical theology) are not. Furthermore, most theologians 
study but one religion – quite often the one they themselves adhere to – and many do so not just 
to gain more knowledge (of religion or humankind in general) but in order to make the religion 
relevant to contemporaries.  
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theories of cognition and evolution,4 been with humans for a long time. When 
scholarship on the history and evolution of humankind and of religion(s) can 
detect institutionalised modalities of religion(s), the same (study of the) his-
tory of religion(s) shows that various religions (or ‘religious traditions’) have 
exercised considerable influence on histories, societies and cultures throughout 
the world. 
Religion(s), including, for example, the naming of something as ‘reli-
gion’, giving something status of ‘religion’, and religious and non-religious ‘dis-
courses’ on religion simply are essential in the social formation and identity 
construction,5 including past and present ‘politics of identity’. Knowledge of 
all these ‘religion-related discourses’ (including practices), then, is important 
knowledge if ‘we’ want to have (and if states want their citizens to have) quali-
fied knowledge of the world, of ‘world-making’, humankind, social formation, 
identity construction, etc., - and knowledge of all of this is vital if we want to 
have qualified knowledge of religion. To quote scholar of religion Jeppe Sinding 
Jensen: ‘Delving into human nature might tell us something about religion and, 
conversely, exploring religion should enable us to probe into human nature’ 
(Jensen, 2019, p. 115).
The Scientific Study of Religion(s) 
The modern science (or academic study) of religion6 may have many 
forerunners, but it seems certain that the development of it in Europe was 
linked to the Enlightenment and its plea for rationality and reason, including, 
not least, rational and critical approaches also to religion (see Wiebe, 2016; cf. 
also Preus, 1987; Strenski, 2006; Stroumsa 2014). 
In order to hopefully avoid misunderstandings among readers unfamiliar 
with the history of the scientific study of religion(s), it can be added that what is 
often called the ‘naturalistic’ approach to religion (a first instance of which one 
may find in, e.g., David Hume’s [1777] Natural History of Religion) is not an inven-
tion by some hard-core atheist scholars of religion or anti-religious philosophers. 
4 See titles by Armin W. Geertz (2013, 2016) as well as the Festschrift edited in his honour by Anders 
Klostergaard Petersen et al. (2019) for introductions to the massive output of research on religion, 
cognition and evolution.
5 For theories and analyses of religion as a dimension, marker, and classifier in regard to social 
formation, authority, hierarchy, power, identity construction, etc. see – apart from classical works 
of e.g. Durkheim (and his Paris ‘equipe’) – the influential work by scholars like Burton L. Mack, 
Jonathan Z. Smith, Bruce Lincoln, and Russell T. McCutcheon (specifically McCutcheon, 2019).
6 This article does not provide a full-fledged definition of ‘science’, be it science ‘as such’ or science 
as in ‘natural’, ‘social ‘and ‘human’ science, nor does it flesh out key constituent characteristics 
of the scientific study of religion(s). What follows is, however, sufficient for the purpose of this 
article and its argument.
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It was (as also emphasised by, e.g., Ivan Strenski, 2006) in many cases imagined 
and promoted by people and scholars who were religious themselves.7 Some were 
also (Christian) theologians. Nevertheless, many of the very same scholars agreed 
that a science of religion (and what frequently has been called a methodological 
‘agnosticism’ or even ‘atheism’) as a human and natural phenomenon was pos-
sible, and that the science or study of religion(s) ought to be institutionalised and 
housed in universities together with, next to, and/or in direct opposition to theo-
logy. Though the study of religion (precisely because of its critical-analytical study 
of religion as a human, social, historical and cultural phenomenon and construct) 
is ‘religion-critical’ – especially if seen from the point of view of a religious insider 
– it is so in a non-ideological way. This, at least, is the norm.  
Consequently, when the highly influential scholar of religion, Bruce 
Lincoln, in an effort to characterise ‘religion’ as a particular kind of ‘culture’, 
writes that the defining characteristic of religion is the way it invests ‘specific 
human preferences with transcendent status by misrepresenting them as re-
vealed truths, primordial traditions, divine commandments and so forth’ (Lin-
coln, 2000, p. 416), Lincoln, by way of the ‚mis‘ in ‘misrepresenting’, may, in my 
opinion, be seen as taking a step in the direction of a normative and therefore 
not so normal definition of and analytical-critical approach to religion.
A younger scholar, Russell T. McCutcheon (often mentioning Lincoln as 
a ‘mentor’ and often considered more radically critical in his approach to reli-
gion than most other scholars) takes pains to distinguish his critical approach 
from a normative critique of religion.
Such a stance satisfies what I take to be the requirements of a non-con-
fessional approach to the study of religion, one that is in keeping not 
only with the publicly funded nature of the field but also with the widely 
adopted canons of the Human Sciences (much as we’d hope, I would 
imagine that a Political Science course studies the mechanisms of party 
politics and avoids deploying normative judgments about which of their 
politics is progressive and thus preferable). (McCutcheon, 2019, p. 99)
The study of religion(s) (traditionally) brackets the ‘truth claims’ of 
religion(s) in order to study religion in a scientific way as a human, social, and 
cultural phenomenon. This is why it is often said to be methodologically ‘ag-
nostic’ and ‘impartial’, trying its best to be ‘neutral’, and ‘objective’. 
7  F. Max Müller, famous for editing the ground-breaking (1879-1910) Sacred Books of the East, 
for his ideas for a science of religion (as ‘comparative religion’), and for his (re-) use of Goethe’s 
dictum “He who knows one knows none”, was but one of many ‘founding fathers’ who, one way 
or the other, were ‘religious’.
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This, however, also means that (most) scholars of religion do not think 
that ‘anything goes’. Only a small minority of scholars of religion consider so-
called alternative kinds of knowledge (including what may be called religiously 
based or ‘esoteric’ knowledges) equal to the knowledge produced by science.
Donald Wiebe, arguing against such claims of a plurality of (postulated) 
equally valid and valuable ‘knowledges’ about religion, writes that the academic 
study of religion, in order for it to ‘live by the same epistemic constraints as the 
other sciences’, must let its claims be ‘governed by the boundary conditions es-
tablished by the methodologies and substantiated knowledge of the natural and 
social sciences’, and produce ‘knowledge expressed in testable propositional 
claims’ (Wiebe, 2016, p. 192). Though not explicitly mentioning the human sci-
ences, Wiebe, however, adds that: 
[…] “fields of study” within the “modern research university” which are 
“beyond the range of the natural and social sciences [...] present no sig-
nificant challenge to the overall scientific ethos of the modern university 
which is predominantly concerned to discover and disseminate public 
(i.e. objective) knowledge about public (i.e. inter-subjectively avail-
able) facts concerning states of affairs in the natural and social worlds. 
(Wiebe, 2016, p. 191)
This author is in full agreement: such ‘fields of study’, including the study 
of religion(s), ought and must ‘present no significant challenge’ to the overall 
‘scientific ethos of the modern research university’. Or, in the words of another 
prominent and influential scholar, Armin W. Geertz:
The secular study of religion is understood [...] to mean the non-sectar-
ian, non-religious study of religion. It is not necessarily an atheistic ap-
proach. It simply chooses to interpret, understand and explain religion 
in non-religious terms. It confines itself to analytical models grounded 
in a view of the world based on the insights and achievements of the nat-
ural sciences. The study of religion, obviously, is not a natural science. 
It applies methods, theories and models developed in the human and 
social sciences: history, sociology, linguistics, psychology, anthropology, 
ethnography and philosophy. It is further characterized by a compara-
tive interest in all religions throughout human history. But its view of the 
world is secular and humanistic. (Geertz, 2000, p. 21)
38 ‘jensen’s scientific approach’ to religion education
R. J. Zwi Werblowsky (1924-2015), one of the most prominent scholars 
within the International Association for the History of Religion (IAHR), the 
preeminent international association for the cross-cultural, analytical and his-
torical study of religion, during the 1960 IAHR World Congress in Marburg, 
Germany, formulated a series of presuppositions for the kind of academic study 
of religion(s) to be pursued by the IAHR and its (today) more than fifty nation-
al, regional and international member associations and affiliates. Werblowsky’s 
‘presuppositions’ have, time and again (and most recently in Jensen & Geertz, 
2016) been seen as the basis for work of the IAHR and its global membership.
The full statement cannot be reproduced here, but key parts read:
1. [...] ‘Comparative Religion’ is a well-recognized scientific discipline 
whose methodology may still be in great need of further elaboration, but 
whose aim is clearly a better understanding of the nature of the variety 
and historic individuality of religions, whilst remaining constantly alert 
to the possibility of scientifically legitimate generalisations concerning 
the nature and function of religion. 
2. Religionswissenschaft understands itself as a branch of the Humanities. 
It is an anthropological discipline, studying the religious phenomenon 
as a creation, feature and aspect of human culture. The common ground 
on which students of religion qua students of religion meet is the re-
alization that the awareness of the numinous or the experience of tran-
scendence (where these happen to exist in religions) are – whatever else 
they may be – undoubtedly empirical facts of human existence and his-
tory, to be studied like all human facts, by the appropriate methods. [...] 
[T]he discussion of the absolute value of religion is excluded by defini-
tion, although it may have its legitimate place in other, completely in-
dependent disciplines such as e.g., theology and philosophy of religion. 
3. The statement that „the value of religious phenomena can be under-
stood only if we keep in mind that religion is ultimately a realization 
of a transcendent truth“ is to be rejected as part of the foundations of 
Religionswissenschaft. […]
4. The study of religions need not seek for justification outside itself as 
long as it remains embedded in a culture pattern that allows for every 
quest of historical truth as its own raison d´être. Whatever the subse-
quent use made by the individual scholar of his special knowledge, and 
whatever the analysable sociological function of scientific activity in any 
specific cultural and historical situation, the ethos of our studies is in 
themselves. (Schimmel, 2016 [1960], pp. 82–83; italics in the original)
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This statement has, as said, been a ‘guiding light’ for generations of 
scholars and is, to this very day, used by the IAHR leadership (cf. Jensen & 
Geertz, 2016) to indicate a consensus as regards basic presuppositions for a 
scientific study of religion(s). I – per extension – add that it is therefore also 
indicating the basic presuppositions for the study-of-religion(s) based RE that 
I find the only one appropriate for a public school. The ethos of such a study-
of-religion(s) based RE is no different from the ethos described and prescribed 
by Werblowsky.
The Scientific Study of Religion(s) in the Academy 
When reading (and, to a large extent, agreeing with the works of ‘de-
constructivist’ or ‘discourse theory’ scholars8 as well as works of scholars ap-
plying cognitivist, biological, and evolutionist approaches,9 it is tempting to 
say that science and knowledge of religion(s) (and of humankind, history and 
evolution), if thoroughly scientific and qualified, must be produced in inter- 
or cross-disciplinary university settings, with tight collaboration between the 
natural, human, and social sciences, between specialists in culture as well as in 
cognition, biology, neurology, sociology, philology, and history (to mention but 
some of the forms of expertise needed). 
One may, moreover, argue (for equally good reasons) that a continued 
use of the notion of ‘religion’ (as anything but a contested analytical category) as 
well as the continuous life of ‘departments for the study of religion(s)’ may well 
be an impediment to gaining the very knowledge aimed at because starting out 
from a notion of ‘religion’ that is, despite sincere and thorough reflections on 
the epistemological pitfalls, misleading. Some, for instance Fitzgerald (2017, p. 
138), may also claim that the very notion of ‘science’ over against ‘religion’ (like 
‘religious’ over against ‘secular’) – and thus also a ‘science or study of religion’ 
– are but instances of a “modern liberal myth transformed into common-sense 
reality.”
Others (e.g., Martin & Wiebe, 2012) argue that existing departments of 
religious studies are not appropriate places for a scientific study of religion(s) 
because they are not sufficiently emancipated from religious ways of think-
ing about religion and from non- or extra-scientific aims. Martin and Wiebe 
think that in most such departments, not least in the USA, students learn about 
religion(s) as well as the study of religion(s) as reservoirs of (what is considered 
8 See, e.g., Russell T. McCutcheon (2000, 2007, 2017, 2019) and Timothy Fitzgerald (2017).
9 See the already mentioned works by Geertz (2000, 2013, 2016) and in honour of Geertz 
(Klostergaard Petersen et al., 2019).
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positive) values. As treasuries for (what is also considered positive) personal, 
human development, and for the ‘mastering’ of so-called existential questions 
about life and death, meaning and meaninglessness, tolerance, inter-cultural 
and inter-religious understanding, and peaceful coexistence: all aims that 
Wiebe and Martin (quite rightly, I think) consider at variance with the aims 
of (the mentioned presuppositions for) a scientific study of religion(s). All ex-
amples of what Wiebe earlier (1984, 2011) criticised as a ‘failure of nerve’ of the 
study of religion(s). Courses in many departments named religious studies are, 
Martin and Wiebe claim (2012, p. 12), courses in ‘religion appreciation.’
The author of the present paper sees the point in each of the mentioned 
critical approaches to the study of religion(s) as well as to some study-of-
religion(s) departments, and there certainly are indications that not all existing 
departments for the study of religion(s) are ‘fine-tuned’ to the kinds of scientific 
studies of religion(s) that, e.g., the above-mentioned scholars of religion con-
sider appropriate and timely.10 
Nevertheless (and Wiebe and Martin (2012, p. 13) also admit to this) 
there are quite a few scholars engaged in (striving towards) practising a study 
of religion(s) as a scientific discipline and as a discipline housed by departments 
of this name. Like Hubert Seiwert (2012) in his response to Martin and Wiebe 
(2012), I do not think that a disciplined scientific study of religion(s) is an impos-
sible ‘delusion’. In fact, I am convinced that it could be empirically proved that 
despite the continued use of the problematic term ‘religion’ and despite the theo-
logical or ‘religion appreciation’ bias or tendencies of some study-of-religion(s) 
departments, scientific, analytical-critical, and non-religious theories and me-
thods on religion are produced in specific study-of-religion(s) departments.11
That scientific and valuable research on religion is also taking place in 
sociology, anthropology, and (even) theology departments is, of course, not de-
nied. However, the more than hundred years of focused historical and compa-
rative study-of-religion(s) work that has taken place at departments for precisely 
that kind of studies simply has produced a valuable reservoir of knowledge, 
theories, and methods, including self-criticism, that cannot be overestimated. 
It can probably always become better, more qualified (as Werblowsky noted in 
10 One such indication is provided by the 2013 (Religious Studies Project) analysis of self-presen-
tations of departments for religious studies on their respective websites. See https://www.reli-
giousstudiesproject.com/2013/12/06/what-is-the-study-of-religionsself-presentations-of-the-dis-
cipline-on-university-web-pages/.
11 Despite criticisms of and problems pertaining to the concept of ‘religion’, and though seeing ‘the 
study of religion [...] more like an organized, specific-purpose field trip into the general region of 
social and cultural processes than [as] a fenced-in disciplinary or departmental acre with its own, 
non-shared. special-to-religion methods’, Willy Braun also speaks in favour of a discipline (and 
departments) called ‘the study of religion(s)’ (Braun, 2000, p. 15).
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1960), and further developed. This is the very ‘soul’ of science. Nevertheless, 
this is, I claim, precisely what has taken place for decades in departments and 
international fora for and about the study of religion(s) by scholars of religion.12
Scholars of religion, educated and working at these departments, have, 
over the years, moved forward and changed the scientific study of religion(s), 
and some have been first movers in critically rethinking religion and the study 
of religion(s). Consequently, I have no problems recommending states to sup-
port the production of scientifically based knowledge of religion primarily by 
way of establishing specific study-of-religion(s) departments.
Making Science-of-Religion(s) Knowledge Known  
to the Public 
Contrary, for instance, to Wiebe who seems to insist that science (of 
religion) must aim at nothing but the production of scientifically based knowl-
edge, I insist that it is possible and desirable to combine research for the sake 
of (and with the aim of) the production of knowledge with the aim of sharing, 
also with society and public at large, this knowledge. In my country, Denmark, 
the current University Act (as of 2002) has made a law of what I consider a 
virtue: scholars are obliged to share their knowledge with society at large, and 
universities are obliged to encourage this. My reason for not just finding it pos-
sible but also laudable is this: scientifically based knowledge about everything 
– about humankind, about the history and evolution of humankind, and about 
knowledge, theories and approaches to religion(s) developed within the study 
of religion(s) – is essential and valuable: a ‘cultural value’.
However, the academic and scientific knowledge of religion(s) is also 
valuable for a linked yet slightly more specific or maybe even extra-scientific 
reason, namely for what I consider the well-being of an open, democratic, plu-
ralist, secular state, and society. 
If an open, democratic, pluralistic, and secular (not ‘secularist’ in the 
sense of ‘anti-religious’) state wants to stay so, then it must give space and voice 
12 I say this well aware also of the recent biting and detailed criticism of Leonardo Ambasciano 
(2019), and I strongly recommend readers who think that a study-of-religion(s) RE (as well as 
‘Jensen’s scientific approach’) is too scientific (or not scientific enough), to consult Ambasciano’s 
book starting with this question: ‘How come that, despite centuries of scientific research, the main 
academic discipline dedicated to the historical study of religion has been – and still is – so blindly 
devoted to an apologetical study of its research object?’ (2019, p. xi) That his first chapter starts 
with an equally critical quote from Luther and Wiebe, followed by a reference to ‘Theses of Meth-
od’ by Lincoln almost goes without saying. However, I still do not change my mind. I put my hope 
in this very discipline or field and in critical scholars like Ambasciano, Lincoln, Martin, Geertz, 
Wiebe, and a host of other scholars of religion. There is, as remarked by Werblowsky, always place 
for improvements.
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to people thinking and speaking of religion in various kinds of ways (religious, 
a-religious, anti-religious), - at times also relatively ignorant ways. However, it 
must likewise establish an analytical-critical and knowledgeable second-order 
discourse on religion, and this is precisely what the scientific study of religion(s) 
located at public universities provides.
In order, however, for the state to ensure that this second-order dis-
course on religion be available and known to the public at large (i.e., to citizens 
of the state), the state must find a way to disseminate it, so that it is not locked 
up within the walls or ‘ivory tower’ of the academy but shared more widely.
Sharing with the public is, however, not as easy as it sounds. The lan-
guage of science is not identical to the language of, for example, the mass or 
social media (see Murphy, 2000), and communicating in a language other than 
that of research and of the scholar is not easy. It is, furthermore, not without 
risks. Entering the public sphere means entering the political sphere, and it is 
evidently a risk for a scholar and the scientifically based (in principle and to 
the highest possible degree value-free, neutral, and a-political) knowledge that 
s/he puts forward to become (or be seen as) all but neutral, value-free, and a-
political. The knowledge that is valuable precisely because it is value-free (to 
the highest degree possible) risks becoming less valuable, maybe even totally 
de-valued, politicised, and thus useless.
The scholar, just like this author during the Danish Muhammad-car-
toons affair (cf. Jensen 2008b; Jensen forthcoming), risks becoming a (masked, 
undercover) politician, a ‘scholar-preacher’ rather than a ‘scholar-teacher’. The 
risks mentioned, of course, evidently are also there if the scholar is a scholar of 
religion, not least at times when religion and religions are hotly disputed mat-
ters in the public sphere and political debates. 
Taking Science of Religion(s) to Public Schools 
The obvious thing to do (and not at all equally risky) is to make a study-
of-religion(s)-based RE part of the public school curriculum, to make the de-
partments for the study of religion(s) responsible for the education and training 
of RE teachers, and to make sure that RE syllabuses, textbooks and teaching in 
public schools are all solidly based on the scientific study of religion(s). RE of-
fered in public schools, then, has to be nothing but a ‘mini study-of-religion(s)’, 
and what the pupils are supposed to learn about religion is the same as what the 
students at the universities learn about religion and about the academic way(s) 
of studying and seeing religion. Pupils and students are not there to learn from 
religion but from the academic study of religion(s) approach to religion. Only, 
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of course, that the teaching and learning in the school are, in terms of didactics 
and pedagogics, tailored to the new context and constraints (e.g.. the time and 
lessons dedicated to the subject, the various age groups and the steps in the 
educational system).
In this way, RE will finally be a normal school subject. It will, just like any 
other school subject, be linked to the respective university-based human, so-
cial, and natural sciences. Nobody would dream of having school subjects like 
biology, history, literature, mathematics, and social sciences taught by teachers 
who did not know about and teach in line with the scientific field or discipline 
in question. Nobody would dream of having textbooks that did not respect and 
render (even if didactically adjusted) what the respective scientific field or dis-
cipline in question had to say about the subject matter in question. Why then, 
should the human, social, phenomenon called religion and the school subject 
RE constitute or pertain to a totally different category? A majority of scholars 
of religion, most of them paid by the state to do their work, agree that it can 
and must be studied just like any other human, social, historical and cultural 
phenomena. Furthermore, they (at least quite a few of them) have shown this 
to be possible for more than a century. 
RE-teachers, educated by scholars of religion at study-of-religion(s) 
departments, naturally, will also have to be well educated in the didactics and 
pedagogics of a study-of-religion(s)-based RE, regardless of whether this RE 
takes place at the elementary school level (primary and secondary school) or at 
the upper-secondary level (gymnasium). This means that the education of RE-
teachers within the study-of-religion(s) departments has to include training in 
the art of sharing scientific knowledge, study-of-religion(s) theories, method-
ologies, and methods with different age groups within the framework of the 
various general and particular curricula or syllabuses for RE in public schools. 
Reduction is a scientific virtue but also a didactical and pedagogical ne-
cessity – and a challenge. But, tailoring the scientific approaches to religion to 
teaching about religion to various age groups is an art that can be taught, and 
the same goes for producing RE textbooks. How to generalise, how to reduce, 
how to teach about, in principle, (almost) everything pertaining to religion as 
studied by the academic study of religion(s) in school, all this can be taught 
and learnt. 
This part of the education of RE-teachers may, of course, be combined 
with teaching about sharing with the public at large via other media than the 
school and text-books, for instance by way of the scholar functioning as an ex-
pert to the media, as author of essays in mass media (including social media), as 
constructor of websites, and as consultant or teacher in regard to qualification 
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of various professions (diplomats, doctors, police officers, prison personnel, 
lawyers, judges, etc.) in need of qualified knowledge of religion(s).
RE as a ‘Mini-Science-of-Religion(s)’ 
I am thus (in line with the arguments in favour of specific study-of-
religion(s) departments as reservoirs and workshops for accumulated and spe-
cialist knowledge of religion(s), discourses on ‘religion’, theory and methodo-
logy in the study of religion, and the history of the study of religion(s)) in favour 
of a time-tabled, compulsory, secular/non-religious RE in public schools. 
In order for it to be a normal, and thus also compulsory, school subject 
with no opt-out possibilities and no alternatives,13 it has to be precisely what 
I argue it must be: study-of-religion(s)-based and thus (as far as possible) in 
contents and approaches also in line with criteria for a compulsory RE such as 
those formulated in landmark cases by the European Court of Human Rights 
and the US Supreme Court: the information and knowledge must be conveyed 
in an objective, critical and pluralistic manner (cf. Jensen, 2002, 2005a).14 
Consequently, I am not only not in favour of religious, confessional, 
multi-confessional (or multi-denominational), inter-religious, inter-cultural, 
or ‘small-c confessional’ RE. I am also not in favour of ‘dimensional’ RE, such 
as it can be found in France when teaching about ‘faits religieux’ takes place 
within the context and contents of other school subjects.15 
RE ought be a separate, ‘mini study-of-religion(s)’ RE, taught by teach-
ers trained at study-of-religion(s) departments, with syllabuses and curricula 
drafted (on behalf of, e.g., a ministry of education) and textbooks written by 
study-of-religion(s) scholars and RE teachers, without any ‘assistance’ (and thus 
contrary to what has been the case in the UK) from so-called religious ‘repre-
sentatives’ or insiders. 
A study-of-religion(s)-based RE also means that the pupils/students, 
when entering the classroom enter as pupils and students (not as, for example, 
atheists, ‘nones’, Christians, Muslims, or Buddhists) with the RE-teacher, from 
13 In many places there are alternatives like ‘Philosophy and Ethics’, ‘Werte und Normen’ and the like. 
The opt-out possibility and/or alternative typically exist because public school RE is confessional 
(as in, e.g., Germany) but it can also exist, as in, e.g., Danish primary school, even if the RE offered 
formally is non-confessional. The opt-out option and/or alternative is normally there with some 
more or less explicit reference to human rights articles on freedom of religion or belief, and on the 
rights of parents to choose the ‘religious upbringing’ of their children. 
14  The Toledo Guiding Principles (OSCE/ODIHR, 2007) has a useful discussion of this and related 
matters in Europe and the USA (Ch. II, and Appendix III); for the US, see Haynes and Thomas, 
2007.
15  See Jensen, 2016, 2017a, 2017b, and Jensen & Kjeldsen, 2013 in which the mentioned various 
kinds of RE in existence in Europe are listed, analysed, criticised and discussed.
c e p s  Journal | Vol.9 | No4 | Year 2019 45
day one, telling and teaching them that this is not about learning from religion 
nor about ‘religion appreciation’ (cf. Martin and Wiebe above). Such an ap-
proach has nothing to do with being ‘disrespectful’ or not taking into account 
the background of the pupils/students (and their parents). This is simply about 
RE being a totally different ‘ball-game’ from religion, religious upbringing, and 
religious instruction. 
This kind of RE, contrary to what is claimed, for example, in the To-
ledo Guiding Principles, does not demand specific ‘sensitivities’ or ‘respect’ from 
teachers. The RE teacher must, as said, from the first lecture make it crystal 
clear what ‘this’ is all about, and s/he may well find inspiration to do so in 
Bruce Lincoln’s (2000) ‘Theses on Method’ (in which he stresses, inter alia, that 
‘[r]everence is a religious and not a scholarly virtue’).
RE is about learning about and (as first formulated by Wanda Alberts) 
from the study (history) of religion(s). It is about learning about and from schol-
arly discourses on ‘religion’ (the notion, the analytical term, the signifier, the 
classifier, whether applied to whatever and for whatever reasons by insiders or 
outsiders), but it is (of course) also about what many scholars of religion still re-
fer to, delineate, define (if only operationally), (re-)describe, analyse and explain 
as religion(s), religious people and places, nay indeed, as (what used to be called) 
‘religious phenomena’ (e.g., myths, rituals, specialists), despite the equally many 
references to, for example,, Jonathan Z. Smith’s ‘map is not territory’ (1978), and 
his, equally [in-]famous, dictum that there is ‘no data for religion’, and that ‘reli-
gion’ is solely the invention of the scholar.16
Having thus mentioned something that may, at least to some colleagues, 
sound almost blasphemous (‘religious phenomena’), I hasten to stress that pu-
pils nowadays, of course, must learn that those ‚phenomena‘ are not ‘out there’, 
to be found just like, for example, stones on a beach and as instances of some 
transcendental ‘sacred’. They are ‘there’, but they are also there to be ‘searched 
out’ for the scholar for a specific purpose: to be constructed and used as ‘analy-
tical tools’. Just as pupils can and must be taught to use ‘religion’ as an analytical 
tool (and disputed notion), so they can and must be taught about the various 
past and present scholarly uses and discussions of ‘myth’ and ‘ritual’ (including 
possible relations between the two). 
16 Without entering into a detailed discussion, I only want to say that I think there are good reasons 
why some buildings, actions, people, thoughts, ways of eating and being together, ways of having 
sex, ways of dressing, etc. may be seen as and ‘stand out’ as not just or only ‘profane’, non-religious 
(they are of course always also that) but as something that may be termed ‘religious’. I am in favour 
of an (operational) definition that sees religion as a cultural (sub-)system differing from other 
such by way of a reference to a postulated more than human and more than natural ‘something’ 
(power, being, scripture, etc.). Lincoln’s detailed definitions and discussions (Lincoln, 2000, 2003) 
are quite helpful, I think.
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Mentioning cross-cultural ‘religious phenomena’ (and thus also me-
thodic comparison), I cannot resist emphasising that a study-of-religion(s) 
based RE (just like a study of religion(s) programme at the university) must, as 
I see it, make quite a lot of comparison(s). If the study of religion(s) is not com-
parative (as well as radically historical), then it is not scientific, and then there 
is no study-of-religion(s). It is by way of controlled comparison of data carefully 
selected for precisely that purpose that we can talk about a specific discipline 
and expertise, and it is only by way of comparison of things we consider similar 
to each other that we can detect the significant (historical) differences as well as 
develop and fine-tune our analytical tools.
Furthermore, the skilled comparison that encompasses, in principle, re-
ligions and religious phenomena from all over the world, past and present, is 
what ‘we’ can add to whatever other ‘knowledge’ of religion(s) that other schol-
ars, pupils, and people, in general, may have. This is the sorely needed distance 
and juxtapositioning that we can offer to contemporary short-sighted debates 
about, for instance, so-called new religions, minority and majority religion(s), 
what religion ‘is’, ‘ought’ to be, and where it ‘truly’ belongs. 
A contemporary study-of-religion(s) based RE cannot but also teach 
about contemporary works and theories on the history and evolution of reli-
gion in relation to the history and evolution of humankind and civilisation. 
I am convinced that teaching about this will help pupils realise the degree to 
which a modern study-of-religion(s) based RE partakes in the efforts of other 
human, social, and natural sciences to penetrate further into the ‘mysteries’ of 
the first human beings, the evolution of humankind and the coming into being 
of culture and civilisation. Teaching about this, indeed, can open the eyes of the 
pupils for other kinds of ‘mysteries’ and ‘wonders’ than those which RE in many 
places wants pupils to ‘see’ by way of an existentialist and/or crypto-religious 
‘big questions’- approach to religion and RE.
 Last, but not least, pupils, in my opinion, will benefit from learning 
something about the largest and most influential of the so-called ‘world reli-
gions’, including something about the early, later and contemporary histories of 
these religions as well as about their positions in various countries as majority 
or minority religions. Pupils in a country like Denmark have to learn more 
about the Lutheran-Protestant kind of Christianity that has been dominant in 
Denmark for more than five centuries than about any other single religious 
tradition. Only in this way may they come to apprehend a scholarly second-
order approach also to this religion, only in this way may they be able to eman-
cipate themselves from normative, prejudiced, Lutheran-Protestant notions of 
religion(s).
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At the same time, they must, of course, learn about the now well-known 
criticism of the ‘world religions paradigm’, as well as about contemporary 
study-of-religions anti-essentialist and de-reification efforts and approaches, 
closely linked, often, to discussions and deconstructions of stereotypical and 
prejudiced notions of religion (and ‘true’ religion) as something with an essence 
and a core – up against which so-called ‘abuse’ of (a) religion or ‘false’ religion 
may be detected and condemned.17
All in all: the study-of-religion(s) based RE aims, as I wrote decades ago 
(Jensen, 1997, 1999), at familiarising the pupils with the second-order study-of-
religion(s) discourse and outsider approaches to religion, at the same time as 
it aims at de-familiarising them with whatever religious, ‘folk’ or ‘prejudiced’ 
notions of religion(s) that they may have acquired from their parents, friends, 
society, or public, popular and political discourses at large. 
In this way RE can contribute, as do other school subjects, to ‘Allge-
meinbildung’, understood as closely linked to the adoption of knowledge, skills 
and competences which are sine qua non for a life in modern society as critical 
and ‘enlightened’ citizens, capable of critically and analytically ‘reading’ every-
thing, also everything that has to do with religion – be it religion ‘out there’, or 
be it religion and notions of religion in religious, academic, public or political 
discourses.
References
Ambasciano, L. (2019). An unnatural history of religions: Academia, post-truth and the quest for 
scientific knowledge. London, UK: Bloomsbury.
Alberts, W. (2007). Integrative religious education in Europe: A study-of-religions approach. Berlin: 
Walter de Gruyter.
Alberts, W. (2008). Didactics of the study of religions. Numen, 55(2), 300–334.
Alberts, W. (2019). After World Religions: Reconstructing religious studies. Numen, 66(1), 89–91.
Andreassen, B.-O., & Lewis, J. L. (Eds.). (2015). Textbook gods. Sheffield, UK: Equinox Publishers.
Antes, P., Geertz, A. W., & Rothstein, M. (Eds.). (2016). Comparative views on comparative religion: In 
celebration of Tim Jensen’s 65th birthday. Sheffield & Bristol, UK: Equinox.
Braun, W. (2000). Religion. In W. Braun & R. T. McCutcheon (Eds.), Guide to the study of religion 
17 For a study-of-religion(s) based teaching about religion(s), including some of the so-called world 
religions, stereotypes and prejudices linked to religion(s) and ‘world religions’ see Jensen et al 
2018. For the ‘world religions paradigm’, see Owen, 2013; Cotter & Robertson, 2015; and Alberts, 
2019. I cannot resist adding that the 2017 revision of the national curriculum for the study-of-
religion(s) based RE in Danish Upper-Secondary School (Gymnasium) has, with reference to the 
criticism of the ‘world religions paradigm’, dropped the term. However, it is the same religions 
that are taught, even if, of course, in ways sensitive to criticism of essentialism, reification etc. For 
essentialism and teaching about religion in school, see Hylén, 2015.
48 ‘jensen’s scientific approach’ to religion education
(pp. 3–18). London, UK & New York, NY: Cassell.
Braun, W., & McCutcheon, R. T. (Eds.). (2000). Guide to the study of religion. London, UK & New 
York, NY: Cassell.
Byrne, C. (2014). Religion in secular education: What in heaven’s name are we teaching our children? 
Leiden: Brill.
Cotter, C. R., & Robertson, D. G. (Eds.). (2019). After world religions: Reconstructing religious studies. 
London, UK: Routledge.
Fitzgerald, T. (2017). The ideology of religious studies revisited: The problem with politics. In S. 
Führding (Ed.), Method and theory in the study of religion: Working papers from Hannover (pp. 
124–152). Leiden: Brill.
Führding, S. (Ed.). (2017). Method and theory in the study of religion: Working papers from Hannover. 
Leiden: Brill.
Geertz, A. W. (2000). Analytical theorizing in the secular study of religion. In T. Jensen & M. 
Rothstein (Eds.), Secular theories on religion: Current perspectives (pp. 21–31). Copenhagen: Museum 
Tusculanum Press.
Geertz, A. W. (2016). Conceptions of religion in the cognitive science of religion. In P. Antes, A. W. 
Geertz, & M. Rothstein (Eds.), Contemporary views on comparative religion: In celebration of Tim 
Jensen’s 65th Birthday (pp. 129–141). Sheffield & Bristol, UK: Equinox.
Geertz, A. W. (Ed.). (2013). Origins of religion, cognition and culture. Durham, UK: Acumen.
Haynes, C., & Thomas, O. (2007). A first amendment guide to religion and public schools. Nashville, 
TN: First Amendment Center. Retrieved from https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/wp-content/
uploads/2016/10/FCGcomplete.pdf
Hylén, T. (2015). Closed and open concepts of religion: The problem of essentialism in teaching about 
religion. In B.-O. Andreassen & J. Lewis (Eds.), Textbook gods (pp. 16–42). Sheffield, UK: Equinox.
Jensen, T. (1999). Religion and religious education in a Europe of conflicting trends. In N. 
Å. Tidmann (Ed.), Into the third millennium (pp. 142–159). Malmö: Foreningen Lárare I 
Religionskunnskap.
Jensen, T. (1997). Familiar and unfamiliar challenges to the study and teaching of religions in 
an increasingly religious and multireligious context. In N. G. Holm (Ed.), The familiar and the 
unfamiliar in the world religions: Challenges for religious education today, (pp. 199–223). Åbo: Åbo 
Akademi University.
Jensen, T. (2005). European and Danish religious education: Human rights, the secular state, and 
‘rethinking religious education and plurality. Journal of Religion and Education, 32(1), 60–78.
Jensen, T. (2008a). RS based RE in public schools – A must for a secular state. Numen, 55(2-3), 33–60.
Jensen, T. (2008b). In the wake of the cartoon crisis: Freedom of expression of academics in 
Denmark. In W. B. Drees & P. Sjoerd van Koningsveld (Eds.), The Study of religion and the training 
of Muslim clergy in Europe: Academic and religious freedom in the 21st century (pp. 243–274). Leiden: 
Leiden University.
Jensen, T. (2011). Why religion education as a matter of course ought to be part of the public school 
c e p s  Journal | Vol.9 | No4 | Year 2019 49
curriculum. In L. Franken & P. Loobuyck (Eds.), Religious education in a plural, secularised society: A 
paradigm shift (pp. 131–150). Münster: Waxmann Verlag.
Jensen, T. (2016). Intercultural religious education: A Study-of-Religions (Re-)view. In A. Ziaka (Ed.), 
Intercultural religious education and Islamic Studies: Challenges and prospects in Greece, Europe, USA 
(pp. 270–296). Athens: Maistros.
Jensen, T. (2017a). RS-based RE – Uphill, uphill, uphill!. In Steffen Führding (Ed.), Method and 
theory in the study of religion: Working papers from Hannover (pp. 199–231). Leiden: Brill.
Jensen, T. (2017b). Religious education in public schools: The most important tendencies (with 
special focus on Scandinavia). Gosudarstvo, Religiya, Tserkov’ v Rossii i za Rubezho, 35(4), 46–71.
Jensen, T. (forthcoming). From respected religion scholar expert to undercover-politician: The fate of 
a religion scholar going public?. Changing Societies and Personalities.
Jensen, T., & Geertz, A. W. (2016). The academic study of religion and the IAHR: Past, present, and 
prospect – An introduction. In T. Jensen & A. W. Geertz (Eds.), The academic study of religion and 
the IAHR: Past, present, and prospect (pp. 1–18). Leiden: Brill.
Jensen, T., & Geertz, A. W. (Eds.). (2016). The academic study of religion and the IAHR: Past, present, 
and prospect. Leiden: Brill.
Jensen, T., & Kjeldsen, K. (2013). RE in Denmark: Political and professional discourses and debates, 
past and present. Temenos, 49(2), 185–223.
Jensen, T. & Rothstein, M. (Eds.). (2000). Secular theories on religion: Current perspectives. 
Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press.
Jensen, T., Reeh, N., Nøddeskou, M. H., Lapis, G., & Bulian, G. (2018). Guidelines on prejudices and 
stereotypes in religions. Venice: Study of religions against prejudices and stereotypes (SORAPS). 
Retrieved from https://soraps.unive.it/outputs/ 
Klostergaard Petersen, A., Sælid, G. I., Martin, L. H., Sinding Jensen, J., & Sørensen, J. (Eds.). (2019). 
Evolution, cognition, and the history of religion: A new synthesis, festschrift in honour of Armin W. 
Geertz. Leiden: Brill.
Lincol, B. (2000a). Culture. In W. Braun & R. T. McCutcheon (Eds.), Guide to the study of religion 
(pp. 409–422). London, UK & New York, NY: Cassell.
Lincol, B. (2000b). Reflections on ‘theses on method’. In T. Jensen & M. Rothstein (Eds.), Secular 
theories on religion: Current perspectives (pp. 117–121). Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press.
Lincoln, B. (2003). Holy terrors: Thinking about religion after September 11. Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press.
Mack, B. L. (2000a). A radically social theory on religion. In T. Jensen & M. Rothstein (Eds.), Secular 
theories on religion: Current perspectives (pp. 123–136). Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press.
Mack, B. L. (2000b). Social formation. In W. Braun & R. T. McCutcheon (Eds.), Guide to the study of 
religion (pp. 283–296). London, UK & New York, NY: Cassell.
Martin, L. H. & Wiebe, D. (2012). Religious studies as a scientific discipline: The persistence of a 
delusion. Religio: Revue Pro Religionistiku, 20(1), 9–18.
Martin, L. H., & Wiebe, D. (2012). Why the possible is not impossible but is unlikely: A response to 
50 ‘jensen’s scientific approach’ to religion education
our colleagues. Religio: Revue Pro Religionistiku, 20(1), 63–71.
McCutcheon, R. T. (2000). Critics not caretakers: The scholar of religion as public intellectual. In 
T. Jensen & M. Rothstein (Eds.), Secular theories on religion: Current perspectives (pp. 167–181). 
Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press.
McCutcheon, R. T. (2007). Studying religion: An introduction. London, UK: Equinox.
McCutcheon, R. T. (2017). ‘Man is the measure of all things’: On the fabrication of oriental religions 
by European history of religions. In S. Führding (Ed.), Method and theory in the study of religion: 
Working papers from Hannover (pp. 82–107). Leiden: Brill.
McCutcheon, R.T. (2019). Fabricating religion: Fanfare for the common E.G. Berlin & Boston, MA: de 
Gruyter
Murphy, T. (2000). Speaking different languages: Religion and the study of religion. In T. Jensen 
& M. Rothstein (Eds.), Secular theories of religion: Current perspectives (pp. 183–192). Copenhagen: 
Museum Tusculanum Press.
OSCE/ODIHR (Organisation for Security and Co-Operation in Europe/ Office for Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights). (2007). The Toledo guiding principles on teaching about religion or 
belief in public schools. Warsaw: Organisation for Security and Co-Operation in Europe, Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. Retrieved from https://www.osce.org/odihr/29154
Owen, S. (2013). The world religions paradigm: Time for a change. Arts and Humanities in Higher 
Education, 10(3), 253–268.
Preus, S. J. (1987). Explaining religion: Criticism and theory from Bodin to Freud. New Haven; CT: Yale 
University Press.
Schimmel, A. M. (1960). Summary of the discussion. Numen, 7, 235–239.
Seiwert, H. (2012). The study of religion as a scientific discipline: A comment on Luther Martin’s and 
Donald Wiebe’s paper. Religion: Revue Pro Religionistiku, 20(1), 27–38.
Sinding Jensen, J. (2019). ‘Where is the future for the study of religion?’ On consilience, anomalous 
monism and a biocultural theory of religion. In A. Klostergaard Petersen, G. I. Sælid, L. H. Martin, J. 
S. Jensen, & J. Sørensen (Eds.), Evolution, cognition, and the history of religion: A new synthesis, 
festschrift in honour of Armin W. Geertz (pp. 115–129). Leiden: Brill.
Smith, J. Z. (1978). Map is not territory: Study in the history of religions. Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press.
Strenski, I. (2006). Thinking about religion: A historical introduction to theories of religion. Oxford, 
UK: Blackwell Publishing.
Stroumsa, G. (2010). A new science: The discovery of religion in the age of reason. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press.
Wiebe, D. (1984). The failure of nerve in the academic study of religion. Studies of Religion, 13, 
401–422.
Wiebe, D. (2011). The failure of nerve in the academic study of religion. In W. Arnal & R. T. 
McCutcheon (Eds.), Failure and nerve in the academic study of religion (pp. 6–31). London, UK: 
Equinox.
c e p s  Journal | Vol.9 | No4 | Year 2019 51
Wiebe, D. (2016). Claims for a plurality of knowledge in the comparative study of religions. In P. 
Antes, A. W. Geertz, & M. Rothstein (Eds.), Comparative views on comparative religion: In celebration 
of Tim Jensen’s 65th birthday (pp. 183–194). Sheffield & Bristol, UK: Equinox.
Wiebe, D. (2019). An old methodstreit made new: Rejecting a ‘science-lite’ study of religion. In A. 
Klostergaard Petersen, G. I. Sælid, L. H. Martin, J. S. Jensen, & Jesper Sørensen (Eds.), Evolution, 
cognition, and the history of religion: A new synthesis, festschrift in honour of Armin W. Geertz (pp. 
130–140). Leiden: Brill.
 Biographical note
Tim Jensen, PhD, is Senior Lecturer and Director of Teaching at the 
Study of Religions, University of Southern Denmark. Honorarprofessor, Institut 
für Religionswissenschaft, Leibniz Universität, Hannover, Germany; Senior Re-
search Fellow Ural Federal University, Ekatarinburg, Russia. Jensen is currently 
(2015-2020) President of the IAHR, the International Association for the His-
tory of Religions (http://www.iahr.dk), the preeminent international forum for 
the critical, analytical and cross-cultural study of religion past and present. He 
served as IAHR Secretary General from 2005-2015, and before that (2000-2004) 
as General Secretary of the EASR, the European Association for the Study of Re-
ligions. Though specialized in ancient Greek religion, he has done research and 
published widely on study-of-religion related methodology, on religion, law, and 
human rights, on applied religious ethics, on religious environmental activism, 
on public discourses and notions on religion, and on public religious education 
from a study-of-religion perspective. 
